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Nagel: Nagel: Missouri's Mystifying Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity:

Missouri's Mystifying Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity: The Imposition of Duty Under
the Dangerous Condition Exception
Martin v. MissouriHighway & TransportationDepartment'
I. INTRODUCTION

In Missouri, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been plagued with
confusion. Much of this confusion has resulted from wrangling between the
Missouri Supreme Court and the legislature. Statutes offering little guidance
have been developed, and hard to reconcile cases have been produced. Perhaps
nowhere is this confusion more evident than in the area of tort liability under the
"dangerous condition" exception to sovereign immunity.
Martin v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Department is a prime
example of the bewilderment bred by Missouri's statute of sovereign immunity
and particularly the "dangerous condition" exception. The Martin court
discusses the conditions under which a duty will be imposed upon a public entity
for a failure to maintain clear zones along state highways. In its attempt to
clarify the law in this area, Martin may have discretely opened the doors to the
broadening of the "dangerous condition" exception to sovereign immunity
through the possible imposition of a duty upon some public entities to adequately
safeguard motorists.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On a rainy night in October 1993, Christina Kelly was traveling from Lee's
Summit to Blue Springs, Missouri, when her car skidded off of the ramp leading
from northbound Highway 291 to eastbound Interstate 70.2 Her car spun around,
slid backwards down a slope, and hit a tree twenty-four and one-half feet from
the roadway. A branch from the tree broke through the passenger window of
the car and struck Kelly in the back of the head.4 As a result of head injuries she
5
received in the crash, Kelly died the next day.
On March 16, 1995, Kelly's mother, Marlene Martin, filed a wrongful death

action against the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission (MHTC)6

1. 981 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
2. Id. at 579.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Since the filing of the suit, the Missouri Highway Department has changed its
name to the Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT). Id. at 579 n.1. MoDOT
is administered by MHTC and it is the MHTC which may sue and be sued in its official
name. Mo. REV. STAT. § 226.100 (1994).
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in the Circuit Court of Jackson County The petition alleged that MHTC was
negligent in planting trees too close to the roadway, allowing those trees to

remain near the roadway, and failing to adequately warn motorists of the trees.'
Further, the action alleged negligence in MHTC's failure to erect guardrails
along the ramp.9 Martin contended that Kelly's death was a direct and proximate
result of one or more of these acts.'
In November 1996, the Circuit Court of Jackson County entered judgment
in favor of Martin for $75,000 after a jury assessed damages at $150,000 and
found MHTC to be fifty percent at fault." In December 1996, MHTC moved
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 2 The trial court granted the motion
and held that Martin did not allege evidence of a defect in the road and that
MHTC did
not owe a duty to a motorist leaving the traveled portion of the
3
highway.
On appeal, Martin claimed that the trial court erred in granting MHTC's
motion for a JNOV. 4 She argued that MHTC had created a dangerous condition
and thus owed a duty to motorists, which was breached when MI-TC failed to
remove the tree. 5 Consequently, she contended that MHTC was not immune
from tort liability.' 6 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri reversed. 7 The court held that MHTC had a duty to maintain a thirtyfoot area of clearance along the edge of the highway and breached that duty by
not removing the tree that caused Kelly's fatal injuries. 8 The court ruled that
MHTC could be sued under the "dangerous condition" exception to sovereign
immunity and that MHTC was not entitled to a state of the art defense. 9

7. Martin v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Dep't, 981 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
8.Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13.Id.
14. Id. "A motion for JNOV should only be granted when all the evidence and
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are so strong against the prevailing party
that there is no room for reasonable minds to differ." Id. (citing Missouri Highway &
Transp. Comm'n v. Kansas City Cold Storage, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997)).
15. Id. at 579-80.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 585.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 584-85.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/6
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Il.LEGAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a party from asserting a
cause of action against the government without its consent. ' ° Sovereign
immunity has its roots in English common law.21 Originally, the doctrine was
conceived solely to protect the king; thus, the saying the "King can do no
wrong" emerged. 22 However, sovereign immunity was soon extended to a
variety of actors in the English government. 23 Today, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has spread to America and invaded both federal and state governments
at all levels.

A. The Colorful Historyof Sovereign Immunity in Missouri
In Missouri, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has had a checkered past.
The wording of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.600 alone indicates the
piecemeal fashion in which this doctrine has developed.24 In order to
comprehend modem sovereign immunity in Missouri, one must first understand

this statute. Developed bit by bit, each subsection of the statute can be seen as
a reaction by the Missouri legislature to a controversial decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court.
Rumblings about the propriety of sovereign immunity first began in O'Dell
v. School Districtofindependence.5 In this opinion, the dissent argued that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity should be abolished because it served no
legitimate purpose.26 The majority, however, would not consider such a change
and left the decision to the legislature.27
This notion, however, again resurfaced in Jones v; State Highway
Commission,28 and this time iitwas successful. In September 1977, the Missouri
Supreme Court ruled that sovereign immunity would be abrogated as of August
15, 1978.29 The court stated that a "'maze of inconsistency' has developed in
suits against cities, producing uneven and unequal results which defy

20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
21. See generallyWilliam S. Holdsworth, The History ofRemedies Against the
Crown, LAW Q. REV., April 1922, at 141 (1922).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (1994).

25. 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1975) (Finch, J., dissenting) (holding that a school
district was not liable in tort for the injury of a high school student by his gym teacher).
26. Id.
27. Id. at409.
28. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).

29. Id.
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3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 6
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
[Vol. 64

understanding."3 In that one decision, the court reversed over one hundred
years of precedent.
Outraged by this decision, the Missouri legislature reinstated sovereign
immunity. Thus, the current statute states that "[s]uch sovereign or
governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to
September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated or modified by
statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full force and effect."'
During this same session, the legislature also established two waivers of
sovereign immunity. The first was for injuries directly resulting from the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a public employee during the course
of his employment.32 The second was for injuries caused by the condition of a
public entity's property.33
Bartley v. Special School District34 continued the controversy over
sovereign immunity. In Bartley, the plaintiffs argued that the school district
waived its sovereign immunity because it had purchased liability insurance. The
Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the legislature had
waived sovereign immunity for public entities only as provided in Section
537.600.1 subdivisions one and two and only then to the extent that the entity
had purchased liability insurance for such purposes. 5
Once again the legislature countered by passing subsection two of Section
537.600, which states:
The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified
in subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1 of this section are absolute
waivers of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations
whether or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or
proprietary capacity and whether
or not the public entity is covered by
36
a liability insurance for tort.
This subsection expressly overruled Bartley by stating that sovereign immunity
was waived if the entity fell under one of the express statutory exceptions,
regardless of whether liability insurance had been purchased.
The Missouri Supreme Court's next move came in State ex rel. Trimble v.
Ryan. 37 The issue in this case was whether the Bi-State Development Agency

30. Id. at 229 (citing O'Dell,521 S.W.2d at 417-19).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.1 (1994).
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.1 (1) (1994).
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.1 (2) (1994).
34. 649 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1983). In Bartley, the plaintiffs sued the special school
district for their injuries, which were inflicted when another student assaulted them on
the school bus. Id. at 865.
35. Id. at 868.
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.2 (1994).
37. 745 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/6
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was a public entity under Section 537.600 and thus immune from tort liability
unless exempted by one of the exceptions.38 The supreme court concluded that
Bi-State was a public entity and not a municipality because it exercised
"substantial governmental authority and power., 39 This holding was important
because municipalities did not have sovereign immunity when exercising a
property function like bus transportation.4 °
In response to Trimble, the legislature enacted subsections three through
five of Section 537.600.41 Subsection three set up an express waiver of
sovereign immunity for proprietary functions of multi-state compact agencies,
such as Bi-State.42 Subsection four declared that prior to Jones public entities
were never immune from suit for torts committed by employees engaged in
proprietary functions.43 Subsection five stated that Trimble erroneously
interpreted the law and public policy of the state. 4"

38. Id. at 673.
39. Id. at 674; see also Stacy v. Truman Med. Ctr., 836 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1992)
(analyzing when a defendant, such as a hybrid agency, may be classified as a public
entity).
40. Municipalities are immune from suit for torts arising from their governmental
functions, but not from torts arising from proprietary functions. See State ex rel.Trimble
v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 672, 673-77 (Mo. 1988).
41. H.B. 161, § A, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1989).
42. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.3 (1994) states:
The term 'public entity' as used in this section shall include any multi-state
compact agency created by a compact formed between this state and any other

state which has been approved by the Congress of the United States.
Sovereign immunity, if any, is waived for the proprietary functions of such

multi-state compact agencies as of the date that the Congress of the United
States approved any such multi-state compact.

43. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.4 (1994) declares:
Pursuant to the prerogative of the general assembly to declare the public
policy of the state in matters concerning liability in tort for public entities, the
general assembly declares that prior to September 12, 1977, there was no
sovereign or governmental immunity for the proprietary functions of multistate compact agencies operating pursuant to the provisions of sections Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 70.370 to 70.440, and Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 238.030 to 238.110,
including functions such as the operation of motor vehicles and the
maintenance of property, involved in the operation of a public transit or
public transportation system, and that policy is hereby reaffirmed and
declared to remain in effect.
44. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.5 (1994) states:
Any court decision dated subsequent to August 13, 1978, holding to the
contrary of subsection 4 of this section erroneously interprets the law and the
public policy of this state, and any claimant alleging tort liability under such
circumstances for an occurrence within five years prior to February 17, 1988,
shall in addition to the time allowed by the applicable statutes of limitation or

limitation of appeal, have up to one year after July 14, 1989 to file or refile an
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Missouri's sovereign immunity law remains in flux. More changes are
bound to occur as the legislature and the Missouri Supreme Court battle over the
definition of sovereign immunity. An area likely to encounter much change in
the coming years and undergo an abundance of court debate is the "dangerous
condition" exception to sovereign immunity, which is the focus of Martin v.
MissouriHighway & TransportationDepartment.
B. The "DangerousCondition'"Exception to Sovereign Immunity
In order to state a claim under the "dangerous condition" exception to
sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the property is in a
dangerous condition; (2) that the plaintiff's injuries directly resulted from the
dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of harm of the kind the plaintiff incurred; and (4) that a public
employee in the course of his employment negligently created the condition or
that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition.45

The courts have defined a dangerous condition as a defect that is physical
in nature.' "Intangible acts such as inadequate supervision, the lack of warnings
and/or signs, the inability to secure an area and the lack of barricades do not
' A dangerous condition
create a dangerous condition."47
must pose a physical
threat of harm to an individual without intervention by third parties.4"
Once it is established that a dangerous condition exists, the plaintiff must
show that the plaintiff's injuries directly resulted from the dangerous condition.49

action against such public entity and may recover damages imposed by the
common law of this state as for any other person alleged to have caused
similar damages under similar circumstances.
45. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600(2) (1994). See generally Alexander v. State,
756 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Mo. 1988); Warren v. State, 939 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Thompson v. City of West Plains, 935 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Ielouch v.
Warsaw R-IX Sch., 908 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
46. Alexander, 756 S.W.2d at 542.
47. Necker v. City of Bridgeton, 938 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see
also Hedayati v. Helton, 860 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Kanagawa v. State
ex rel. Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. 1985), overruledby Alexander,756 S.W.2d
at 540.
48. See Alexander, 756 S.W.2d at 541 (dangerous condition created by placement

of partition against ladder, creating physical deficiency in state's property); Necker, 938
S.W.2d at 655 (dangerous condition not found in a non-defective four inch wide, twelve

inch high balance beam placed next to wall in gym); Kilventon v. United Missouri Bank,
865 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (dangerous condition found when explosives
Were discovered in unmarked trailer); State ex rel. St. Louis State Hosp. v. Dowd, 908
S.W.2d 738, 740 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (dangerous condition not found in paper shredder
because there was no risk of harm until activated by a third party).
49. lelouch, 908 S.W.2d at 771-72.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/6
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The courts have held that direct cause is synonymous with "proximate cause" or
"cause which directly, or with no immediate agency, produces an effect."5 The
test is "whether, after the occurrences, the injury appears to be the reasonable
and probable consequence of the act or omission of the defendant.",51 For
instance, in Pattersonv. Meramec Valley R-III School District,52 the Eastern
District found the "dangerous condition" exception to sovereign immunity
inapplicable due to a lack of causation.53 The plaintiff brought a negligence
claim against the school district arising from an injury that occurred when the
plaintiff's classmate threw a broken piece of asphalt at the plaintiff.54 The court
found no causation in that the plaintiff did not allege in his petition that he was
injured as a pedestrian by the defect in the asphalt.55 In contrast, in Dorlon v.
City of Springfield,56 the Southern District found that the plaintiff had made a
submissible case on the issue of causation in a tort action for a slip and fall

accident. 7 The plaintiff claimed that a dangerous condition in the sidewalk, a
raised chunk of concrete, caused her fall.58 The court held the jury was free to
believe or disbelieve the direct testimony of the plaintiff.59
Further, a plaintiff must show that the dangerous condition created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the type incurred by plaintiff.60 For
example, in Godrey v. Union Electric Co.,61 the Eastern District implicitly held
that a car accident was not foreseeable when the driver crashed into a privately
owned utility pole located a few feet from the roadway because the court found
that Union Electric owed no duty to the plaintiff.62 However, in Linton v.
Missouri Highway & TransportationCommission,63the Eastern District found
a car accident, in which a vehicle hit a retaining wall at an intersection, to be

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 771.
Oldaker v. Peters, 869 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
864 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 16.

54. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 16; see also Theodoro v. City of Herculaneum, 879 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that business owner failed to allege facts showing that the condition
of the city's fire hydrant directly resulted in the fire which destroyed his property).
56. 843 S.W.2d 934, 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 936.
59. Id. at 942-43; see also Oldaker v. Peters, 869 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that testimony of traffic engineer that lighting should have been installed at time
roadway was constructed and testimony of eye witness as to blind spot was sufficient to
establish causation and make MHTC liable).
60. See generallyO'Dell v. City ofBreckenbridge, 859 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
61. 874 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
62. Id. at 505.
63. 980 S.W.2d 4 (1998).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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reasonably foreseeable in light of the fact that the car never deviated from public
property.'
Lastly, the evidence must prove that the public employee negligently
created the condition or that the public entity had constructive or actual notice
of the dangerous condition. 65 For instance, in Lockwood v. Jackson County,6 the
Western District held that the county had sufficient constructive or actual notice
of a dangerous condition at the county park's exercise station and thus was not
immune from a personal injury claim. 7 The court noted that the county
designed and constructed the park trail and had responsibility for maintaining the
exercise stations on that trail.68 Further, the court found that even if the county
did not have actual notice, it was on constructive notice.0 The dangerous
condition, even though it may not have been obvious or notorious, existed for
such a length of time that the city should have discovered it in the exercise of
ordinary care.70 In contrast, in Koppel v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
71
the Eastern District held that the St. Louis Sewer District was immune
District,
72
from liability for property damage to homes caused by a raw sewage back up.
The court found that the owners had failed to show that the public employees
negligently created the condition or that the district had actual or constructive
knowledge of the condition.73
Even if all four of these elements have been met, a defendant may still
escape liability under the "dangerous condition" exception by asserting the state
of the art defense found in Section 537.600.2. 74 This defense applies only to

64. Id. at 8.
65. See generally Trumbo v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 877 S.W.2d 198
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Beyerbach v. Girardeau Contractors, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994); O'Dell, 859 S.W.2d at 166; Stevenson v. City of St. Louis Sch. Dist.,
820 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
66. 951 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
67. Id. at 357-59.
68. Id. at 357.
69. Id. at 357-58.
70. Id. at 358.
71. 848 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
72. Id. at 520.
73. Id.
74. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.1(2) (1994) provides:
In any action under this subdivision wherein a plaintiff alleges that he was
damaged by the negligent, defective, or dangerous design of a highway or
road, which was designed and constructed prior to September 12, 1977, the
public entity shall be entitled to a defense which shall be a complete bar to
recovery whenever the public entity can prove by preponderance of the
evidence that the alleged negligent, defective, or dangerous design reasonably
complied with highway and road design standards generally accepted at the
time the road or highway was designed and constructed.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/6
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highway design and acts as a complete bar to recovery.75 If a defendant can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegedly dangerous,
negligent, or defective design of the highway or road reasonably complied with
at the time the road or highway was built, the plaintiff may not
design standards
76
recover.
If all four of these elements have been established and the state of the art
defense is unavailable, sovereign immunity is waived, and a plaintiff may
recover in tort against a public entity. However, a plaintiff's recovery is capped
at $100,000. 77 This cap applies regardless of whether the public entity is a
municipality, whether it carries liability insurance, or whether it was engaged in
a proprietary function.78
C. The "DangerousCondition" Exception and the Duty to Maintain
Clear Zones NearRoadways
Prior to Martin, Missouri courts had consistently held that an accident was
not foreseeable even if it occurred only a few feet from the roadway.79
Consequently, public entities had no duty to maintain clear zones and thus were
not liable under the "dangerous condition" exception to sovereign immunity.
This basic principle was reiterated in Williams v. City of Independence,0 in
which the Western District held that "an injury is reasonably foreseeable if a
'driver and vehicle normally using the roadway or deviating slightly in the
normal use of the roadway will potentially encounter injury from the placement
and maintenance of the [condition].' 8 1 The court, in that instance, held that a
car crossing the center line of the road, traveling through the opposite lane of
traffic, and driving across several private lawns, before hitting a wall eight feet
off of the road, was not foreseeable.82 More importantly, the opinion contained
75. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.1(2) (1994).
76. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.1(2) (1994).
77. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.610.2 (1994).

78. See Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1992). Wollard
involved a claim against Kansas City for an injury sustained as the result of a dangerous
condition on the city's property. Id. at 201. The Missouri Supreme Court held that Mo.
REv. STAT. § 537.600.2 (1994) eliminated the distinction between governmental and
proprietary capacities of public entities in relation to the dangerous conditions and motor
vehicle exceptions of the Section. Id. at 203-05. Therefore, any claim of damages under
either exception is subject to the $100,000 cap. Id. at 205-06.
79. See generally Clinkenbeard v. City of St. Joseph, 10 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1928);
Godfrey v. Union Elec. Co., 874 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Noe v. Pipe Works,
Inc., 874 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Rothwell v. West Cent. Elec. Coop., 845
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Lavinge v. City of Jefferson, 262 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1953).
80. 931 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
81. Id. at 896 (quoting Rothwell, 845 S.W.2d at 44).
82. Id. at 897.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 6
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
[Vol. 64

dicta that driving directly off of a paved roadway and eight feet down a slope
would not be a "slight deviation.""3
Williams v. City ofIndependence followed a long line of cases that reached
a similar narrow definition of what constitutes a "slight deviation" from the
roadway. The first case to deal with this issue was Clinkenbeardv. City of St.
Joseph.' In that case, the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle hit a utility pole
located one to three feet off of the roadway." The Missouri Supreme Court held
that the city was not "chargeable with actionable negligence in the maintenance
of the parkway... [or pole], which were entirely and wholly outside of the
traveled and improved roadway ...designated by the defendant city for ordinary
vehicular travel and use of the public." 6
Lavinge v. City ofJefferson 7 also reached a similar holding when a plaintiff
was injured as the result of striking a concrete wall on private premises a few
feet outside of a public street.8" The Western District characterized the accident
as a "complete departure from the street over a course not shown ever to have
been used for travel." 9 More recently, the Western District held in Rothwell v.
West CentralElectric Cooperative" that it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff
would veer off of the roadway and strike a utility pole located eight to eleven
feet from the roadway. 91
Finally, in the case of Noe v. Pipe Works, Inc,' the Eastern District seemed
to shrink the definition of slight deviation from the roadway to the point that it
became meaningless, where nothing would constitute a "slight deviation.' The
court held that a utility company had no duty to a motorcyclist who collided with
a utility pole situated forty to fifty-six inches off the roadway.9 While the court
could have distinguished this case and found liability, it instead chose to follow
Clinkenbeard,using precedent as a way to avoid the consequences of increased
liability. The court stated that "[e]ven if we were to ignore the practical
ramifications which would affect utility companies, state, county and
municipality highway and road departments statewide as a result of such ruling,
we are constitutionally without authority to overrule the controlling decisions of
the Supreme Court." 94

83. Id.
84. 10 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1928).
85. Id. at 55.
86. Id. at 62.
87. 262 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
88.Id. at 61.
89. Id. at 64.
90. 845 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

91. Id. at 44.
92. 874 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
93. Id. at 503-04.

94. Id. at 504.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/6
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Thus, for twenty years prior to Martin, the Missouri courts had so narrowed
the definition of "slight deviation" from the roadway that entities such as the
highway department could safely assume that if a motor vehicle deviated from
the roadway it would not be held liable. However, Martin v. Missouri
Highway & TransportationDepartment may have signaled a change in such
immunity, and entities may no longer be safe in assuming that they will not be
liable for failing to adequately safeguard motorists who deviate slightly from the
roadway.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Martin, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri reviewed Missouri's doctrine of sovereign immunity to determine
whether MHTC was liable in tort for not maintaining certain clear areas along
Missouri roadways.9 5 The court found MHTC liable under the "dangerous
condition" exception to sovereign immunity and held that MHTC had waived
any defenses to such liability through the adoption of certain national safety
guidelines.96

In reaching its holding, the court of appeals first considered the propriety

of the trial court's decision to grant a JNOV to the defendant.97 The court found
the trial court's ruling to be erroneous in that it mistakenly relied on Williams v.
City oflndependence98 to establish that MHTC owed no duty to anyone leaving
the traveled way." The court of appeals examined Williams and the line of cases
that preceded it, which had held that municipalities and utility companies were
not liable to drivers who deviated slightly from the roadway.1°0 The court
distinguished those cases on the ground that the public entities involved did not
assume a duty to maintain the area adjacent to the traveled way and protect
against the dangerous condition) °
In this case, however, the court found that MHTC had assumed a duty to
create safe clear zones for motorists. 0 2 The court examined several statutes
before implying such a duty. Under Missouri Revised Statutes Section

95. Martin v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Dep't, 981 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
96. Id. at 585.
97. Id. at 579. A JNOV is only appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a
submissible case. See supra note 14.
98. 931 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Williams held that a car crossing the
center line of the road, traveling through the opposite lane of traffic, and driving across
several lawns did not qualify as a slight deviation from the road. Id. at 896.
99. Martin, 981 S.W.2d at 580.
100. Id. See also supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
101. Martin v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Dep't, 981 S.W.2d 577,580 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
102. Id.
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227.030.1, MHTC was given control over the construction and maintenance of
the highway system. 3 MHTC was also authorized under Section 227.220 to
remove any obstruction to the lawful use of the highway system, including
removing or trimming trees within or overhanging the right-of-way." 4 From
these statutes, the court concluded that MHTC had control over the entire rightof-way for highway purposes and was responsible for cutting vegetation growing
in such right-of-way that might interfere with driving safety." 5
The court also found that MHTC was a member of the American
Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and had
adopted its guidelines. 6 As a member ofAASHTO, MHTC received guideline
manuals in both 1967 and 1974, which prescribed unencumbered roadside
recovery areas of thirty feet or more in width from the edge of the traveled
way.'0 7 The manuals stated that "corrective programs should be undertaken at
once to eliminate from the roadside or to relocate to protected positions such
hazardous fixed objects as trees.""' They further warned that trees of large trunk
size planted next to the roadside were "potential hazards.""' In 1989, MHTC
also received AASHTO's "Roadside Design Guide," which prescribed formulas
for determining the appropriate clear zones."' The court noted that the
prescribed clear zone for the area of the accident was sixty-four and one-half feet
from the edge of the ramp.'
After a thorough examination of the Missouri statutes and the AASHTO
guidelines, the court determined that MHTC had a duty to maintain clear areas
along state highways."' The court rejected MHTC's arguments that a duty to
maintain clear zones did not arise until after it adopted a clear zone policy in
1966 and that its maintenance policy dictated that mature trees should be cut
only if dead or if determined to be in extremely hazardous locations." 3 MHTC
argued that the tree involved in Kelly's accident was neither dead nor extremely
dangerous; therefore, it owed no duty to remove it.14 The court stated that even
if MHTC did have a duty to remove only extremely dangerous trees, the
103. Id. at 580.
104. Id. at 581.

105. Id.
106. Id. AASHTO is made up of highway departments from all fifty states. Id.
The association develops standards for the design and maintenance of state highways.
Id.

107. Id.
108. Id. The AASHTO guidelines are published in a manual entitled "Highway
Design and Operational Practices Related to Highway Safety." Id. It is referred to by
AASHTO members as the "Yellow Book." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 582.

111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Id.
114. Id.
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evidence sufficiently showed that the tree was located in a very hazardous
area." ' The court reviewed testimony that the tree was less than thirty feet from
the roadway on an unrecoverable slope, where two accidents had occurred in the
previous month.1 6
MHTC set out two additional arguments in support of the trial court's grant
of a JNOV." 7 First, MHTC claimed that Martin failed to make a submissible
case that the tree constituted a dangerous condition under Section 537.600.8
The court found, however, that Martin presented sufficient evidence to establish
a dangerous condition." 9 First, Martin established that there was a dangerous
condition of the property in that the tree was placed less than thirty feet down a
non-recoverable slope. 2 Second, the evidence proved that Kelly's injuries
directly resulted from the dangerous condition, as the tree branch caused her fatal
head injuries.'' Third, the evidence showed that the injuries Kelly sustained

were reasonably foreseeable in light ofthe dangerous condition because the clear

zones were established to prevent those types of injuries." Fourth, the plaintiff
established that the employees of MHTC had planted the tree in 1966 as part of
the Federal Highway Beautification Act, and that it was reasonable to infer that
the recently planted tree did not comply with the
by 1967 MHTC knew that
23
prescribed clear zones.1
Finally, MHTC argued that it was entitled to a state of the art defense under
Section 537.600.1(2).124 The court, however, disagreed, 5 holding that the
defense applied only to claims relating to the design of the highway. Martin's

115. Id. at 582-83.
116. Id. According to the expert testimony at trial, a recoverable slope has at least
a 4 to 1 ratio. The slope leading to the tree had a ratio of 3.1 to 1. Id. at 583.
117. Id. at 583.
118. Id. See supra notes 45-78 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 584.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 584-85. This defense in Section 537.600.1(2) states:
In any action under this subdivision wherein a plaintiff alleges that he was
damaged by the negligent, defective, or dangerous design of a highway or
road, which was designed or constructed prior to September 12, 1977, the
public entity shall be entitled to a defense which shall be a complete bar to
recovery whenever the public entity can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the alleged negligent, defective, or dangerous design reasonably
complied with highway and road design standards generally accepted at the
time the road or highway was designed and constructed.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.660.1(2) (1994).
125. Martin v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Dep't, 981 S.W.2d 577,585 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
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claim was not based on the original design of the ramp, 2 6 as the tree was planted
as part of a separate program over one year after the ramp was designed.'
Further, MHTC could not claim such a defense as it had
assumed a duty to
28
remove the tree by its adoption of a clear zone principle.
After considering all of the evidence, the court found that Martin had
presented a submissible case. 2 9 Therefore, it reversed the trial court's grant of
a JNOV in favor of MHTC. 30 The court remanded the case for a reentry of
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.'
V. COMMENT
The Martin court seemed to extend the duty to maintain clear zones under
the "dangerous condition" exception to sovereign immunity further than any
other Missouri court had in the preceding twenty years. This can partly be
attributed to the court's broader definition of what constitutes a slight deviation
from the roadway.' In Martin, the court found that MHTC had assumed a duty
to maintain clear zones along the outer portion of the highways, and thus it was
liable for failing to remove the tree that Kelly struck when her vehicle deviated
twenty-five feet from the roadway.'33
If the Martin court had wanted to avoid the practical consequences of
increased liability upon the highway department, as was the worry of the Noe
court, it simply could have followed Clinkenbeard;however, it chose not to do
so.'
The court, in an effort to avoid Clinkenbeard and its successors,
distinguished its decision on the ground that in this case MHTC had assumed a
duty to maintain the roadway through its participation in AASHTO.'35
It is interesting to note, however, that the court implied that a duty could
have been found in several of those cases. 3 6 This criticism about the narrowness
of earlier decisions came in a footnote, which stated that "[s]ome of the cases
following Clinkenbeardhave gone so far as to read it as stating that as a matter

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 582-83.
134. Clinkenbeard v. City of St. Joseph, 10 S.W.2d 54, 62 (Mo. 1928); Noe v.
Pipe Works, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
135. Martin v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Dep't, 981 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
136. Id. For instance, the court criticized the holding of Noe. Id.
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of law municipalities and utility companies do not have a duty to 137
motorists to
keep safe any of the area outside the traveled portion of the road."'
It is difficult to determine whether this note may indicate a change of
sentiment that could signal the potential overruling of cases, such as
Clinkenbeard and Noe, and the widening of tort liability for highway
departments, municipalities, and utilities. For years, plaintiffs' attorneys have
criticized the court's reliance on Clinkenbeardas outdated.'38 Indeed, it does
seem that Clinkenbeardhas been used to so narrowly define the phrase "slight
deviation from the roadway" that almost no accident qualifies as reasonably
foreseeable.' 39 Thus, many public entities may escape liability when in actuality
they should have a duty to make the roadways reasonably safe for all drivers.
Even if Clinkenbeardand its progeny are not overruled, lower courts that
criticize their rationality may be able to avoid the harshness of sovereign
immunity. Through the use of the "dangerous condition" exception, if a duty on
the part of a public entity to maintain and keep the untraveled portion of the road
safe can be found, liability may be imposed. In Martin itself, for instance, a
JNOV for the defendants would have been sustained but for the court's active
search of the record for evidence that a duty had been established through the
adoption of AASHTO guidelines. Courts could possibly, in this way, distinguish
a case from precedent.
However, it may be just as likely that the law will remain unchanged, and
Clinkenbeardwill be the rule for years to come. The Missouri Supreme Court
does indeed consider the practical consequences of overruling precedent and
may worry that imposing liability on highway departments, municipalities, and
other public entities will create an avalanche of lawsuits and dire financial
consequences for those affected. For instance, the possible future consequences
to the Missouri Department of Transportation from one decision like Martinmay
be immeasurable. How many large trees are located within the supposed thirty
foot clear zones on any Missouri highway? Courts simply may not want to
decrease the protections of sovereign immunity and impose such liability.
Further, even if courts react favorably to Martin, given the history between
the Missouri judiciary and the legislature, the Missouri legislature may respond
to any such loosening of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a very
unsympathetic manner. 40 The legislature may react, as it has in the past, by

modifying Section 537.600 to protect such entities as the highway department
from liability. 4 '
Martin could perhaps be the instigator of yet another battle between these
two branches of the government. In the past, the legislature has had a strong
interest in preserving sovereign immunity and protecting agencies, such as
137.
138.
139.
140.

Martin, 981 S.W.2d at 580 n.2.
See, e.g., Noe, 874 S.W.2d at 502.
See supranotes 79-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.

141. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
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MHTC, from tort liability.'42 In contrast, Missouri courts have often worried
about the implications of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as dramatically
demonstrated by their abolition of the doctrine in 1977.'"
Martin does seem to signal a possible change in the "dangerous condition"
exception to sovereign immunity in connection with the duty to safeguard
motorists who deviate slightly from the roadway. Such a change seems to be a
positive move. Earlier case law regarding the "dangerous condition" exception
as it applied to vehicles veering off of the traveled portion of the highway had
carried the definition of slight deviation from the roadway to the point of
absurdity, where no duty could ever be found. The question remains, however,
whether Martin will ever be extended to other factual situations or whether
courts will continue to follow Clinkenbeardgiven the possible consequences of
increased liability upon such entities as the highway department.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of sovereign immunity in Missouri is difficult to predict. The
legislature and the Missouri Supreme Court have been at war for years over tort
liability and sovereign immunity, and the battle is likely to continue. The
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri's imposition of
liability in Martin was probably a step in the right direction, as MHTC
undoubtedly accepted a duty to maintain clear zones along the highways.
Whether a duty to keep motorists safe outside of the traveled portion of the
roadway will ever be implied in other situations is questionable, but Martin may
hint at such a future.
STACY L. NAGEL

142. See supranotes 25-44 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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